This paper addresses the idea that there may be two types of autobiographical facts with distinct cognitive and neural mechanisms: "Experience-near" autobiographical facts, which contain spatiotemporal content derived from personal experience and thus depend on the medial temporal lobe (MTL) for retrieval, and "experience-far" autobiographical facts, which are abstract memories and thus rely on neocortical brain regions involved in retrieval of general semantic memory. To investigate this conceptual model of autobiographical fact knowledge, we analyzed the nature of autobiographical facts that were generated by 8 individuals with MTL amnesia and 12 control participants in a recent study of identity and memory [Grilli, M.D., & Verfaellie, M. (2015). Supporting the self-concept with memory: insight from amnesia. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 10, 1684-1692]. Results revealed that MTL amnesic participants generated fewer experience-near autobiographical facts than controls. Experience-far autobiographical fact generation was not impaired in amnesic participants with damage restricted to the MTL, but there was preliminary evidence to suggest that it may be impaired in amnesic participants with damage to the MTL and anterior lateral temporal lobe. These results support a cognitive and neural distinction between experience-near and experience-far autobiographical facts and have implications for understanding the contribution of autobiographical fact knowledge to self-related cognition.
Introduction
Autobiographical facts represent personal knowledge about an individual's life. According to models of self and memory (Conway, 2005; Haslam et al., 2011; Prebble et al., 2013) , autobiographical fact knowledge supports a variety of self-related cognitive functions, including constructing a personal identity, maintaining continuity with one's past, and thinking about one's future. All autobiographical facts are similar in that they have been extracted from life experiences and therefore do not incorporate the degree of detail characteristic of episodic memory: memories that involve re-experiencing singular events. However, it is not known whether autobiographical fact knowledge relies on a unitary set of cognitive and neural mechanisms, or alternatively, whether there are different types of autobiographical facts supported by distinct mechanisms. To understand how autobiographical fact knowledge contributes to self-related cognition and is affected by neurological disorders and psychiatric conditions, it is important to close this gap in knowledge.
We (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2014) recently proposed that autobiographical facts vary in the extent to which they contain spatiotemporal content that has been derived from personal experience (for a similar perspective, also see Renoult et al. (in press) ). According to this viewpoint, "experience-near" autobiographical facts, although lacking the detail of episodic memory, are not completely devoid of spatiotemporal information. Rather, they incorporate content that was derived from unique event experiences (e.g. my first child was born during a blizzard), repeated event experiences (e.g. I went to happy hours with friends every Friday as an intern), or lifetime period experiences (e.g. I was involved in sports during college). In contrast, "experience-far" autobiographical facts have undergone a more complete abstraction process and thus do not include spatiotemporal content that is linked to unique, repeated, or broader lifetime period experiences (e.g. I have four siblings; I live an active lifestyle). Based on this theoretical framework, experience-near autobiographical facts may share mechanisms with episodic memory and thus depend on the medial temporal lobe (MTL) for retrieval, whereas experience-far facts, once consolidated, may rely on neocortical brain regions involved in retrieval of general semantic memory (Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010) . Consistent with this idea, findings from neuropsychology (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2014; Philippi et al., 2015) and functional neuroimaging (Martinelli et al., 2013) 
